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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis stems from a vast body of literature on
affective assessment (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 9).
has two goals.

As such, it

First, the writer intends to replicate the

findings of the previous affective assessment studies by
employing a sentence-completion methodology that has not
been used previously.

Second, the writer hopes that this

thesis will advance the understanding of affective assessment as a top-down process involving organization of material into the context of an overriding conceptual category.

This latter goal draws on the tenets of logical learn-

ing theory (LLT) (ibid., chaps. 7-9).
Before proceeding further, an explanation of the term
"affect" as it is used in conjunction with "affective predication" is necessary.

The writer wishes to distinguish his

proposed meaning of "affect" from that which is espoused by
the mood induction studies in Bower's (1981) tradition.

In

the latter case, affect is to be understood as a physiological state, synonymous with emotion or mood.

In the context

of research on affective assessment/predication, affect
signifies a purely cognitive evaluative construct, operationally defined as an idiographic rating of an item on a
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"like -dislike" dimension of meaning.

In earlier research

on LLT, the score along this dimension was termed reinforcement value (RV).

Thus, RV is the operationalized measure of

a subject's affective assessment of literally anything in
his/her experience. In this sense, affect is similar to the
osgoodian (Osgood, 1952) evaluative dimension on the semantic differential scale.

It is this Osgoodian interpretation

of the term that Fiske and Taylor (1984) refer to as the
"fourth code," noting that its role in cognition is yet to
be deciphered.
Another issue that must be addressed at this time is
the distinction between the terms "meaning" and "meaningfulness."

According to Rychlak (1988, pp. 51-57), meaning is a

construct signifying a pattern of relations between items,
as well as "the relation between a user of such meaningful
ties and the items he/she employs for understanding."
(ibid., p. 57).

Thus, the meaning of the word "dog"

includes the superordinate relations such as categories to
which it belongs like "animals" and "pets."

It may also

include features such as "big brown eyes," and "fur."

In

addition, the meaning of the word dog may encompass its
symbolic significance

"loyalty."

The meaningfulness refers to the latter part of the
definition of meaning, one that highlights the relation between the person doing the understanding and the item
he/she understands.

Rychlak defines meaningfulness as "a
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measure of the extent of meaning

i.e., clarity, cen-

trality, import, value-- the item holds for the individual"
(ibid., p. 57).

The RV measure mentioned above is thus one

of the operationalizations of meaningfulness, henceforth
referred to as affective meaningfulness.
The central theoretical claim made in this paper is
that meaningfulness (as defined by affective assessment)
effects cognition in the top-down fashion.

Specifically,

the present experiment investigates the effect of meaningfulness in learning.

The postulate here is that once the

affective judgment rendered by an individual in relation to
an item is known, one can predict what items that individuals is more likely to learn.
This contrasts with the typical "association value"
interpretation of meaningfulness in verbal learning studies
that conceptualize the effects of meaningfulness in the
"bottom-up" fashion.

Here, meaningfulness is a measure of

the subject's familiarity with a given item,

a formulation

that relies on the assumptions of a frequency and/or contiguity principle to account for the patterning of meaning.
As such, any explanation of the obtained effects of meaningfulness

must ultimately refer to the nomothetic mediating

influences external to the person as idiographic evaluator,
and thus inherently input driven.
The first chapter of this thesis is dedicated to the
discussion of the theoretical assumptions held by

th~

models
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that base their explanation of cognition on the frequency/contiguity principles.

Based on the terminology suggested

by Rychlak (1988, chap. 3), these models will be referred to
as Lockean models -- a nomenclature that reflects their
philosophical and historical origins.

This discussion will

center around the assumptions pertaining to the causation of
mental phenomenon as they are conveyed by the Lockean formulation of association.

A number of current cognitive

models will be discussed in light of these assumptions as
well as their explanations of affect and meaningfulness.
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to place the construct of
affective assessment within a historical-theoretical framework.

Again, using Rychlak's (ibid.) terminology, the

construct of affective assessment reflects the Kantian theme
in psychological explanation.

Thus, the issue to be ad-

dressed here is what constitutes this line of philosophical
theorizing, and how is it different from the philosophical
development of the association models.

The explication of

the differences between these models will be focused upon by
the relation of an individual to the presented stimuli.

As

I will argue, according to the Kantian model, an individual
is regarded as an active conceptualizer of his/her experience, rather than a passive recipient of environmental
stimuli.

A predicational model proposed by Rychlak (ibid.,

chap. 7) to capture such active conceptualization of
experience will be presented.
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A review of literature beginning with the early research on affective meaningfulness which established the
role of affective assessment in learning and stresses its
orthogonality with association value will be presented next.
studies that lend support to the formulation of affective
meaningfulness in terms of the predicational model will also
be taken up.
The present project differs from previous research in
two respects.
stimuli.

First, sentences are used as experimental

Second, the affective valence is measured nomo-

thetically by relying on inter-rater agreement.

The present

methodology employs a sentence completion task in which
subjects must complete sentences lacking a predicate, administered following a learning trial.

Given the evidence

that suggests the commencement of affective predication at
the initiation of cognition, subjects are expected to know
the affective valence of the predicate before the "word"
meaning per se. of that predicate is fully known.
a sentence such as

Thus, in

"When solving problems, John is fast,"

subjects would be able to state that the predicate is positive in affective meaningfulness before they could think of
a synonym to "fast" -- such as "swift."

CHAPTER II
THE LOCKEAN MODEL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
As suggested in the introduction, Rychlak (1988, chap.
3) identifies what he calls the Lockean tradition in
psychology, named after John Locke, although this style of
though goes back to ancient philosophy (e.g., Democritus).
It is fair to say that the term "Lockean tradition" is
tantamount to "British empiricism."

The influence of

British empiricism in psychology is indisputable.

The Lock-

ean position was adopted early in the historical development
of scientific psychology, and it became dominant with the
advance of American psychology in the early part of the
twentieth century (ibid., chaps. 3 and 4).
did not wane.
psychology,

Its influence

Referring to the recent domain of cognitive
Bourne, Ekstrand, and Dominowski (1971) state

that British empiricism "is the movement which gave the
psychology of learning and thinking most of its important
problems and defined its essential content" (p. 21).
More often than not, the references made to British
empiricism are made in the context of association theory
(see ibid., chap. 1;

Tarter, 1988, chap. 1; Chaplin & Kra-

wiec, 1974, chap. 1).

But, the term "association" per se.
6
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was first used by Aristotle to ref er to the relationships
between items in the memory (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3, Anderson & Bower, 1979, chap. 2).

According to these authors,

the British empiricists imposed a theoretically limited
interpretation of association.
As such, the construct of association serves as an
excellent starting point for the analysis of the theoretical
assumptions held by the Lockean tradition.

As will be

asserted shortly, the essence of the limitation upon the
explication of association mentioned above entails the
understanding of the relations between items exclusively in
terms of "efficient cause" (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3).

Such a

narrow interpretation of association in terms of efficient
cause further infuses other assumptions into the theoretical
framework which include conjectures regarding human nature
and the relationship between past and present events.
Besides the already alluded to task of expounding the philosophical assumptions of the Lockean tradition, this chapter
intends to illustrate the influences of these assumptions in
the current models of cognition and to show their effects in
the contemporary understanding of affect and meaningfulness.
The purpose here is to set the stage for the theoretical
critique of the Lockean tradition.
Efficient Cause and Association
The foremost theoretical assumption of the Lockean
tradition is that most observed relations can be explained
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by the efficient cause.

The efficient cause is the cause/

effect relationship occurring when an antecedent elicits a
consequent within a temporal order.

In other words, it is

motion over time (see Rychlak, 198la, Introduction).
This emphasis on efficient cause explanation of the
relationships is evident in a thrust toward identification
of antecedents found in the work by the British empiricists.
David Hume, for instance, suggested contiguity, resemblance
and cause and effect as his principle of association
(Boring, 1950, p. 191).

David Hartley added repetition

(ibid., p. 197) -- a frequency construct.

James Mill con-

tributed vividness (ibid., p. 224) in addition to contiguity
and frequency, and John Stuart Mill extended the list of
possible antecedents with similarity, intensity and inseparability (ibid., p. 229).

As such, we find these

antecedents at the origin of a causal event.

They provide

an impetus that sets the causal progression in motion.

The

Lockean tradition further assumes that these antecedents
originate in the environment and thus effect the mental
events through experience by way of sensory input.

As-

sociation can be viewed as the consequence of these antecedents.

For instance, it is not uncommon in psychology to

say that two items become associated due to frequency of
their co-occurrence.

Yet, this statement stops short of

disclosing the complete picture.

The postulated association

between two items is not an end in itself, rather it. is a
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causal explanation of some other obtained effect such as a
probability of one item being generated given the other.
The latter is the lawful consequent of the antecedent, while
association is the representation of the "motion over time"
between an antecedent and a consequent, and thus a
relational construct.

It is, in the words of Hume (cited by

Anderson & Bower, 1979, p. 24). the "gentle force that commonly prevails" (italics added).

Related Philosophical Assumptions
Thus, according to the causal scheme laid out so far,
the environmental antecedents set forth the lawful progression towards the specific consequents.

The dogma of

environmental determinism logically follows the assumption
of efficient causation.

Since the antecedent of a causal

event originates in the environment, it is in the environment where one can trace the origins of all effects.
The route from a given environmental antecedent to an
observed consequent is not necessarily direct.

The British

empiricists distinguish between simple and complex ideas
(Chaplin & Krawiec, 1974, chap. 1).

The simple ideas are

direct inputs from the environment through sensory modalities, while the complex ideas represent aggregation of
simple ideas previously experienced.

The process of the

aggregation of simple ideas into complex ones does not
change the fundamental principles of causation postulated by
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the British empiricists.

As the term "aggregation" sug-

gests, this process is an additive, constitutive process.
In Hume's example (cited by Anderson & Bower, 1979, p.23)
for instance, an idea of a "house" is composed of a sum
consisting of items such as "doors," "windows," and so on,
in the same way a real house in composed of bricks.
Hence, the explanation of any complex phenomenon ultimately
rests in the understanding of its constituent parts, which
according to the Lockean formulation, ultimately originate
in the direct experience of the environment.

As a result,

the notion of environmental determinism is reaffirmed even
in the cases were direct progression of causation is not explicit.

Furthermore, here we find the basis for reduc-

tionism, since the complex can be explained in terms its
constituent parts.

Note, that the temporal order of the

relation between the simple and complex ideas parallels that
of efficient causation.

Like antecedents, simple ideas are

always first in the temporal order.

These principles serve

as a foundation for the mediational modeling, that prevails
in psychological theory (see below).
In this causal scheme, an individual is delegated a
strictly passive role -- that of a tabula rasa.

Namely,

he/she does not actively intercede in the causal scheme of
things, but rather registers its effects.
more complex causal relations,
upon the tabula rasa

In the case of

the previous "inscriptions"

serve to direct the new causal rela-
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tions.
Implications of the Lockean Tradition in Psychology
The adaptation of British empiricism by psychologists
coincided with the advance of psychology as a scientific
discipline.

On the surface, the scientific method appears

to rest upon the Lockean view of causation, because the procedure of validating a hypothesis follows the temporal order
implied by the efficient cause.

The antecedents lend them-

selves well to the interpretation as the independent variables (IV), and the observable consequences as the dependent
variables (DV).

But, in equating the Lockean tradition with

scientific method, one is confounding theory with method
(Rychlak, 1968, chap. 8).
The problem lies in the interpretation of the causal
relation intervening between IV and DV, in fact, in the definition of association.

For instance, assume that we want

to test a hypothesis that associative strength between items
facilitates learning.

The null hypothesis tested here is

that "strength of association will not facilitate learning,"
and the experimental hypothesis may be stated as follows:
"If items are highly associated, then they will be easier to
learn."

This logical proposition in itself does not state

anything about the nature of the causal relation between IV
(i.e.,the degree of association) and DV (i.e, measure of
learning rates).

According to Meehl

(1990), this consideration of the causal relation can be at-
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tributed to the interpretative context of the theory tested.
Thus, the possible interpretation of this relation in terms
of efficient causation (i.e., facilitation occurs because
strongly associated items elicit one another) is post hoc
and reflects a philosophical bias rather than a conclusion
based on results.

Rychlak refers to this as an S-R bind:

"limiting one's theoretical conceptions to an efficientcause frame" (Rychlak, 1981b, p. 516).

In fact, one can

further delimit the historically acceptable interpretation
of results chiefly to the consequences of the frequency and
contiguity principles among the antecedents mentioned above.
(Bugaj & Rychlak, 1989).

Thus, the meaning of association

in psychology is even narrower than that allowed by the
British empiricists -- not only is it an efficient cause
relation, but it is also a relation due to the specified
antecedent.
A clear example of this efficient cause formulation of
association as due to the frequency and contiguity
principles is found in the verbal learning measures of
associative strength that are used to account for the
relatedness of verbal items.

Derived by averaging responses

on a free association task, the metric of associative
strength was thought to reflect the actual frequency of the
items' co-occurrence in a given environment (Deese,
1962).

considering the stated purpose to "remove computa-

tion inadequacies of S-R theories" (Anderson, 1983, p. 6)
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such as verbal learning, it is therefore not surprising that
cognitive models retain frequency and contiguity principles
in their causal assumptions pertaining to the explanation of
semantic relations.

For instance, Wyer and Carlson (1979)

proposed a network model in which the degree of relatedness
between "nodes" that represent various concepts is
determined by the frequency and the recency of activation of
a pathway uniting the two.

Wyer and Carlson further suggest

that the "strength of association" between the nodes is a
function of the "diameter" of a path between them, that
becomes thicker when frequently activated.

According to Mc-

Clelland's (1988) model, the so-called "connections" between
the items are assigned weights that are adjusted based on
the frequency of their activation.

As more weight is

assigned to a given pathway, there is a greater probability
that activation will take that route.

Collins and Loftus

(1975) also view semantic relations as the network of
associative pathways connecting different nodes representing
meanings.

In their model, the spread of activation is

determined by the length of a postulated associative link,
as well as the diversity of associative links connecting one
node to another in the network.
Considering the distinction between association as the
relation between items and association as the
"gentle force," the postulated "links" or "pathways" between
nodes can be seen as representing the former.

On the other
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hand, the activation construct used by these models takes
from the latter.

Here, an assumed force is actually

traveling or spreading within a postulated cognitive structure, and the direction as well as the strength of this
force is determined by the frequency and contiguity principles.
Underlying the reliance on frequency and contiguity
principles is the assumption that associations formed due to
the effect of these antecedents are directly based on
sensory experience, and thus can be used to explain more
complex relations such as similarity and/or categorization.
For instance, Underwood, Ekstrand, and Keppel (1965) use the
strength of association construct to explain similarity in
terms of conceptual relations as associations of various
items to the same category name.

The feature based model of

similarity (Tversky, 1977) also inherently relies on
frequency/contiguity principles -- at least in explaining
how features become associated with given concepts before
they enter into the process of comparison to derive "similarity" (see Medin, 1989, for review and criticism of the
application of this model to concept formation).

In either

case, the relationship between associations based on frequency/contiguity principles and the more general concepts
of similarity and category is reminiscent of the relationship between simple and complex ideas.
Thus, the type of explanation offered by the Lockean
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models for the more complex phenomenon is that of mediation,
defined as any type of cognitive modeling that relies on
past experiences to account for a complex phenomenon (Bugaj
& Rychlak, 1989).

The simple associations, those formed due

to sensory input of frequency/contiguity, must already be
inscribed upon the "tabula rasa" in order for the process of
aggregating them into the complex ideas can take place.
This type of theorizing highlights the reductionism of the
Lockean models and affirms the assumption of the environmental determinism.

With diligence, one can trace the cause

of all effects to the environmental input that determines
the course of causal progression leading to a given output
no matter how complex that final output is.

Within this

theoretical framework, the role of an individual remains as
passive as it was in the days of early behaviorism.
zeitgeist has not changed; it is still Lockean.

The

What did

change with time was the metaphor describing an individual,
in the direction of being more "attuned" with the
technological advances. For instance, John Watson saw an
individual as "a machine ready to run," while Skinner saw
the person as a "black box."

The contemporary metaphor is

cybernetic, as theorists talk of "information processing" or
"decision rules" depicting such in terms of computer-inspired flow-charts.

Not surprisingly, in view of the dimi-

nished importance of an individual in the causal scheme, and
the salience of environmental determinants, the Lockean
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theorists generally take an extraspective point of view
meaning that they " (frame) theoretical explanations of
things and/or events in the third person, from the convenience of an observer" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 512).
Xhe Lockean Explanations of Meaningfulness and Affect
The explanations of meaningfulness and affect made in
the Lockean tradition reflect the tenets of that theoretical
orientation.

Within the Lockean theoretical framework, the

meaningfulness of an item is defined as the item's familiarity (Houston, 1976, p. 223)

This conceptualization of

meaningfulness dates back to the work by Ebbinghaus who
found that one tends to memorize a poem more easily than a
list of nonsense syllables (Hintzman, 1978, p. 20).
Familiarity in itself is a frequency/contiguity basedrelation; to put it simply, the more familiar the item is,
the more likely it has been encountered in the past.

Under-

wood, Ekstrand, and Keppel (1965) reflect this basic principle by ref erring to meaningfulness in terms of frequency
of an item in the linguistic environment.

Collins and

Loftus's (1975) network model offers a similar interpretation.

The more often an item appears in the person's expe-

rience, the more likely it is to appear contiguously with
the other items, thus forming associative links with those
items.

In turn, these associative links provide more

avenues for access to the original item.
Since these formulations define meaningfulness' in
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terms of the previous experiences with items, the operationalization of meaningfulness is no longer a metric of
importance or the significance of an item to an individual,
but is a measure of the frequency of his/her encounters with
an item.
of the

eve

To illustrate the latter point, the meaningfulness
trigrams are operationalized either as the number

of word associations a subject can generate in the response
to a trigram, or in terms of the subjects rating whether a
trigram "looked like a word, sounded like a word, or could
be used in a sentence (possibly as an acronym)"
1988, p. 368).

(Rychlak,

The latter operationalization was used by

Archer (1960) in the development of the norms for the
meaningfulness of the trigrams (termed the association value
(AV] of a trigram).
One of the Lockean interpretation of the affect is
found in behaviorism.

Here, it is claimed that liked items

are those that are associated with the positive contingencies, and disliked items are those associated with the negative contingencies (Rychlak, 1988 p. 367).

Thus a person

who consistently ate tasty apples would show a preference
for "apples", while a person who consistently ate spoiled
apples would not.

Thus, this explanation employs both the

contiguity principle (i.e., temporal proximity of a behavior
and a contingency) as well as the frequency principle (i.e.,
the number of times a person has to experience the relation
between a behavior and a contingency in order to learn it).
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If the contingencies have a verbal label, then, these too
would become associated with the item following the same
causal principles.
Working in the verbal learning tradition, Zajonc
(1968) argued that the mere exposure to learnable items
translates into a preference for them.

Thus he relied

strictly on the frequency principle in his causal explanation of affect.

Zajonc's explication of affect stipulates

its relation to the meaningfulness, since both are assumed
to be "due" to the frequency of previous exposures.

Hence,

the value of an item in the eyes of an individual is explained by citing the environmentally determined frequency
of the item's exposure in the individual's experience.
In his comprehensive review of cognitive psychology,
Mandler (1985) cites three possible explanations of affect
(as defined here) to which he refers to as cognitive evaluation, and discusses in the context of emotions (p.
116).

Interestingly, it is a rather short section and

rather speculative, thus revealing the relative disinterest
cognitive psychologists have shown toward this area.
It should be noted from the outset that Mandler calls
these three explanations "sources" of cognitive evaluation
(ibid.), thus already framing his explanation in terms of
the efficient cause.

The first such "source" is the "in-

nate approach and withdrawal tendencies interpreted as
value" (ibid., p. 117).

Here, we actually see an interplay
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of material and efficient causation.

Mandler proceeds to

list stimuli that elicit approach and avoidance reactions,
such as sweetness and pain.

Thus, at least initially, the

reactions can be attributed to the physical nature of the
stimuli.

He then argues that a person's observations of

his/her pattern of avoidance and approach reactions "produce
the judgment of positive or negative value" (ibid., italics
added).

This second point is based exclusively on the

frequency/contiguity principle since the end result
(affective judgment) is due to association between the
nature of the stimulus and the individual behavior.

As was

the case with the behavioristic position, it would be fair
to say that if a set pattern of behavior is given a value
label this value label would become associated with the
stimulus object.
The second source of cognitive evaluation according to
Mandler has to do with "cultural, social and idiosyncratic
predications" (ibid.).

In contrast to the predicational

model that will be discussed below,
a mediational interpretation.

Mandler gives this term

He stipulates that objects

acquire these "predications" as a result of "personal learning experience," which may or may not involve direct experience with an object.

The distinction between "cultural

and social" and "idiosyncratic" is a matter of scope.
instance, we may learn that "war is hell" through public
media, or that Volkswagens are excellent cars from a

For
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personal conversation with a friend.

While the first

attitude may be shared by a large segment of our culture,
the later sentiment may be shared by few.

Yet, regardless

of the scope of the affective relation, an individual is
still a passive recipient of that information, rather than
being actively involved in rendering an affective judgment.
Thus, the source of the affective value remains external to
a person; although one may not directly experience war, one
nevertheless directly experiences a contiguous presentation
of the term "war" with its affective label.

The difference

between a pacifist and a warmonger can be explained by the
difference in the previous input pertaining to the value
label associated with "war."
The third source of "cognitive evaluation" has to do
with the "structural value" which (according to Mandler)
"resides in the cognitive structure of objects, in the relationship among features" (ibid.).
component part of an object,

By underscoring the

Mandler already reflects the

Lockean tradition, specifically the reductionism discussed
above.

He further notes that judgment of value depends upon

"frequency of encounter with objects and events" (ibid.),
thus clearly asserting the frequency/contiguity principle.
Since, this thesis intends to explore the notion of
"affective meaningfulness,"

this would be a good point at

which to venture a formulation of the Lockean conceptualization of this construct.

Given that meaningfulness is
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defined in terms of familiarity and affect in terms of the
association between an item and a value label, affective
meaningfulness would involve a strongly associated and
frequently encountered relationship between an item and a
value label.

This is a circular relationship in that

frequent invocation of a given associative relationship will
in turn strengthen that relationship.

The content of the

associative relationship according to the Lockean model
would be determined by the individual's past (or vicarious)
experiences.

The frequency with which this relationship is

"activated," and thus the strength of that relationship
would depend upon the particularities of the individual's environment.

CHAPTER III
KANTIAN THEORY AND PREDICATION
Kantian Perspective
The major point of departure of the Kantian theories
from the Lockean tradition concerns the role of an individual in relation to his/her environment.

In his criti-

cism of the British empiricists, Kant argued that even
sensations must be initially framed in terms of temporal and
spacial dimensions.

Such organization is not in the input

itself, but is rather imposed upon the sensory input to make
it meaningful (Rychlak, 1988, chap. 3).

Thus, the organiza-

tion of the sensations logically precedes the experience
rather than being determined by the experience. As such the
organization is a prior, rather than post hoc.

This is a

top-down formulation of causality that employs the formal
cause rather than the efficient cause.

According to this

perspective a person is no longer a passive recipient of
environmental inputs.

As a nativist, Kant argued that

people impose such organization upon sensation from birth.
In his view, the mind is not a tabula rasa, but rather is
proforma (ibid., p. 91).
The direct effect of the environmental factors is fur22
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ther negated when it comes to higher mental operations such
as thinking and comprehension (ibid., p. 89).

According to

Kant, here we find the operation of transcendental
dialectic, or an ability to think to the opposite of a
premise derived through the conceptualization of direct
experience.

Thus, even though we have an environmental

input premising that two concepts are related, we can imagine these concepts to be unrelated, and proceed behaviorially according to such a negation.

For instance,

despite the previous conceptualization of blond people as
untrustworthy, we can without further input negate this
relation of meaning and place our trust with a blonde
person.

We may also contradict any given premise by imagin-

ing that the opposite premise is true.

As such we may dream

of our immortality, despite the fact that all evidence
points to our eventual demise.

Finally, dialectical

transcendence may involve affirming the premise opposite in
meaning to the premise given.

For example, if the given

premise is "Person A is kind," the opposite premise would be
"Person A is cruel," thus the logical conclusion would
depend upon the meaning of "cruelty."
On a "higher" plane of philosophical abstraction, the
possibility of dialectical transcendence in experience opens
the door for teleological formulations of human cognition.
Since, the organization of environmental input can be
transcended via dialectical reasoning, a person is faced
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with alternatives to a "given" framework of meaning even
when the environment does not provide such an alternative.
In other words, a person is always faced with a choice.
His/her actions thus must be understood in terms of the
choices made, with the understanding that things could have
gone otherwise. This is a final-cause formulation of human
phenomenon.

An action occurs for the sake of affirmed

premises, chosen among at least two opposite alternatives.
The Kantian model is not inherently unscientific, as
some psychologists assume it to be.

The difference between

the Lockean and Kantian traditions would be in terms of the
critical variable postulated to account for a given experimental effect and not necessarily in terms of the
application of scientific method per se.

For example, from

the Kantian perspective, the notorious failure to classically condition infants can be attributed to the infants
inability to frame the contiguous relationships between the
conditioned and unconditioned stimulus (Sameroff, 1971).
The critical variables in the "awareness in conditioning"
studies (see Rychlak, 1981, chap. 7) seem to be the subjects' perception of the relation between the targeted
behavior and the reinforcer as well as their choice either
to comply or not to comply with the experimenter's manipulation.
Given the importance of the person's choice and his/
her framing of the relations in all experience, the in-
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dividual him/herself can be regarded as the "critical
variable" in the causal scheme.

The Kantian model en-

courages us to take an introspective rather than an extraspective perspective --that is to "(frame) theories of
things and/or events in the first person, from the outlook
of an identity acting within them" (Rychlak, 1988, p. 513).

The Predicational Model
The theoretical position advanced in this thesis
assigns to affect the function of organizing materials along
an evaluative dimension of meaningfulness.

Based upon the

tenets of logical learning theory (LLT) (ibid., chaps. 7-9),
the process by which an individual achieves this organization of meaning is termed predication, defined as: "the
cognitive act of affirming, denying or qualifying the
certain patterns of meaning in relation to other patterns of
meaning" (ibid., p. 517).
This definition further stipulates that:"Predication
always proceeds from a broader range of (precedent) meaning
to a (sequaciously) narrower, targeted range of meaning"
(ibid.).
The terms "precedent" and "sequacious" refer to the
logical order which this process follows without consideration for the time factor assumed by efficient causation.

As

this definition implies, the precedent meaning goes first in
the logical order, and hence establishes the logical course
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along which the predication will proceed.

The term "sequa-

cious" literally means "slavishly complaint."

As such, the

result of a given predication is predetermined by the
precedent meaning affirmed, qualified or negated at the
"protopoint"-- the time when such affirmation, qualification
or negations are made (ibid.).

Thus, reflecting the Kantian

position that stipulates the importance of the organization
of input by an active intelligence, the predicational model
postulates that this process occurs at the initiation of
cognition.

In view of the dialectical reasoning endorsed by

the Kantian models, the predicational process involves
denying as well as affirming the precedent meaning.
Rychlak employs Euler circles to illustrate the
logical relation implied by the predicational process (see
Figure 1 below).

No claim is made here that the brain is

drawing these circles, of course.

But as a model within

which to understand how people reason, the Euler circles
used widely in logic, philosophy and mathematics -- prove
helpful.

Thus, for example, when we say that "All human

beings are mortal" we, in effect, frame the meaning of
"human beings" by the broader expanse of meaning that may be
labeled "mortality," or "mortal organisms," and so forth.
The meaning of the latter is extended to the former.

The

"target" (human being) is the end, point, or "telos" to
which meaning is being extended.
The affirmation of "mortality" in relation to "human
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beings" also implies that human beings are not "immortal,"
thUS the affirmation of "mortality" involves the negation of
"immortality" in relation to "human beings."

The meaning of

"human beings" thus also involves the understanding of what
"human beings" are not, and knowing what "human beings" are
not implies knowing what they are.

In this sense, as

illustrated by Figure 1, the outside of the circle delimits
the meaning of what is inside the circle and vice versa.
Thus, oppositionality is always an ingredient in any
It should be noted that the previous

predication.

discussion referred to meaning rather than meaningfulness.
Yet, according to the definition of meaning cited in the
first chapter of this thesis, meaningfulness is the
component of this definition signifying the relation between
a

concept'~

meaning and the individual using that concept

(i.e., word, etc.).

In view of the discussion of the

importance of an individual in the causal schemes postulated
by the Kantian model, the word "component" is

misleading

since it connotes some type of subservience of
meaningfulness to meaning.
individual in such schemes,

Given the significance of an
it is more theoretically

appropriate to elevate meaningfulness to a commanding role
"over" meaning.

Thus, the affective assessment as the

metric of affective meaningfulness (measured via a
liked/disliked dimension) should be regarded as the most
broad and fundamental precedent which a person

extends to
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predicate the meaningfulness of anything in his/her experience.
This brings us to the definition of affective predication, as follows:
Affective predication is the cognitive act of affirming the meaningfulness of any item in experience by framing
it within the broad dimension of likability.

The person's

affective preference of "liked" or "disliked" is extended to
whatever is being focused upon in cognition, just as any
predicate meaning frames and is then extended to some
targeted item of interest.

Inputs from experience do not

determine affective predication.

The latter always frame

the former at the point of "input."

29

Figure 1
Euler Circle Illustration of Meaning Relations
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CHAPTER IV
REVIEW OF LITERATURE IN SUPPORT OF AFFECTIVE PREDICATION
The previous chapter introduced the predicational
model of cognition as an antithesis to Lockean models, and
placed the explanation of affective assessment within the
framework of this predicational model.

The assessment of

the stimuli in terms of a like/dislike dimension is thus
seen as setting forth the major premises in any line of
thought, recollection, and so on.

In the framework of

scientific method, this precedent context can be construed
as the independent variable.

Therefore, the hypothesis

subjected to an empirical validation can be stated as
follows: "If item A is assessed as liked, then B would
follow."

Given the oppositionality implied by the predica-

tion model the related hypothesis is "If item A is assessed
as disliked then non-B would follow."

According to the

logical relations postulated by the predicational model, "B"
and "non B" represent the "telos" or target to which the
major premise is extended.

In the empirical validation of

these hypotheses, they represents the dependent variable.
The present chapter is dedicated to the empirical evidence gathered in support of the theoretical claims made by
30
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the predicational model of affect.

Influence of Affective Assessment on Learning
The early studies on affective assessment have shown
that persons learn consonant-vowel-consonant

(eve)

trigrams

which they have rated as positive more readily than those
which they have rated as negative regardless of the associative value (Archer 1960) of these trigrams.

This was

termed the "RV positive effect" and it was demonstrated in a
number of different tasks such as free recall (Rychlak,
1966), recognition (Labertaux, 1968), or when the rate of
learning was measured in terms of trials to criterion
(Abramson, 1967).
Subsequent studies have also found RV-positive effects
when learning materials were other than
instance,

eve

trigrams. For

Apao (1979) noted that positive affective assess-

ment facilitates the primacy effect when learning words and
Rychlak, Galster and McFarland (1972) and Rychlak and Saluri
(1973) have shown the RV positive effect in learning names.
Slife and Rychlak (1981) discovered that students tend to
get better grades on academic subtopics in a course that
they have prerated as liked.

The RV effect was found

regardless of induced states such as those of psychotropic
drugs among psychiatric subjects (Rychlak, McKee, Schneider

& Abramson, 1971) and alcohol intoxication (Mosbacher,
1984).
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on the other hand, psychiatric subjects

(Rychlak,

McKee, Schneider & Abramson, 1971) as well as high school
students and fifth graders with low self esteem (Rychlak,
Carlsen & Dunning 1974; August,Rychlak & Felker, 1975)
learned negatively rated materials more readily than positively rated ones.

A similar effect was shown by Rychlak,

Carlsen and Dunning (1974) who found that subjects learned
liked words from a realm they assessed as liked (e.g.
relations with authority)
disliked in this realm.

mo~e

readily than the words they

Conversely, they learned disliked

words more readily than liked words in a realm that they had
predicated negatively (i.e., rated as disliked).

Rychlak

and Marceil (1986) demonstrated that subjects' positive or
negative assessment of a paired associates task -- performed
by models before the subjects participated in the identical
task -- determined whether the subjects would learn along a
positive or negative course of affective assessment.

The Relation Between Measures of
Affective and Associated Meaningfulness
Above results, and especially the reversal of the RV
positive effects lend themselves to interpretation of
affective meaningfulness as a predicational process in so
far as they follow the predicted course of meaningfulness
extension postulated by the model.

For instance, in the

case of an RV negative effect, the learning of negative
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items over positive (we may call this a negative learning
style) is sequacious to a broader pattern of meaningfulness
representing negative assessment of self or the learning
situation.

The actual items learned depend on the assess-

ment of those items and the learning style.

We can see the

gradient of "broadness" in this interpretation of results:
from the most encompassing affective predication of self or
the learning task, to the affective predication of items,
reflected in the measure of learning.
Although this is a plausible explanation, it does not
in itself falsify the alternative mechanistic explanations
of affective assessment cited in the previous chapter.
Based upon the Lockean model, we can suggest that the rating
itself is due to frequency of exposure to the stimuli, or in
the behaviorist's interpretation, due to the type of
contingencies involved in these previous exposures. Abramson, Tasto and Rychlak (1969) found no interaction between
RV and associative value (AV) of

eve

trigrams, but showed

strong main effects for each of these variables.

This

pattern of results was obtained both when AV was measured
nomothetically and idiographically.

First of all, what this

suggests is that RV and AV theoretically measure distinct
constructs.

Second, if we are to accept an argument that RV

ratings reflect the quality of previous experiences, we
would expect to find an interaction between the two measures
at the higher levels of association value.

This would be
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the case, because, the more word-like trigrams would more
likely elicit an association to a concept with which a
subject has had some experience.
Kubat (1969) has shown that there is no consistent relationship between the RV of a given trigram and the number
of word associations generated by that trigram in a production method.

This study further suggests that the two mea-

sures are not related.

It also contradicts the "affect as

frequency of exposure" thesis advanced by Zajonc (1968, see
above).

If that were true, contrary to the obtained

results, we would expect a richer associative structure
around the positively rated items than around the negatively
rated items.
Tenbrunsel, Nishball and Rychlak (1968) studied
specifically the relationship between RV and AV measures.
Given the hypothesis that associative meaningfulness accounts for affective meaningfulness, we would expect a
confound between these measures in which the higher AV items
would be rated more positively than lower AV items.

The

study did obtain a degree of confound between these
measures, but it was most predominant among the lower AV
items.

In other words, the pattern of results suggested by

the above hypothesis was limited to the variations in AV
among the items from the lower ranges of Archer's (1960)
norms, but was absent for items from higher ranges of
Archer's norms.

The support for the contention that AV and
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RV are independent comes from the fact that if these measures were the variations of the same thing, we would find a
pattern of results signifying a strong relationship between
high AV items and "liked" rating and low AV and "disliked"
rating, rather than variations within the lower range of
associative norms.
Rychlak, Flynn and Burger (1979) advanced the notion
of orthogonality between RV and AV measures based on the
findings of cross-validating factor analysis.
study, subjects were asked to rate
of different dimensions.

eve

In this

trigrams on a number

Besides looking at the ratings

that correspond to RV measures (i.e., like/dislike) and
those that correspond to AV measures (i.e., word-like/not
word-like) the factor analysis also looked at the judgment
of the items' perceived "learnability" (i.e., easy/hard to
learn, easy/difficult to pronounce).

This was done to

address the criticism that the RV measure may reflect
subjects' estimations of how easy it is to learn a given
item.

The results revealed a clear RV factor and a clear AV

factor as well as a third factor termed "familiarity within
the experiment."

The "ease of learning" judgment tended to

load closer to the AV factor than to the RV factor.

As an

interesting footnote, ratings in terms of Osgood's (1952)
evaluative dimension (i.e., good/bad) loaded on the RV
factor.

As noted in the Introduction, the fourth code

mentioned by Fiske and Taylor (1984) referred to this
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evaluative dimension of the semantic differential.

This

finding allows us to draw a parallel between the evaluative
dimension and the RV rating used in affective assessment
studies.
In view of the demonstrated orthogonality of RV and AV
it does not seem plausible to think of the latter determining the former.

That is, we cannot really suggest that

affection is "due to" frequent and contiguous contact with
this or that item in experience.

It is just as plausible to

suggest that affective assessment is at the basis of frequent contact in life experience.
engage what we like.

We are drawn to and

If we predicate something as harmful,

we are sure to find unlikable aspects of this object or
experience cropping up.

Effects of Affective Predication on
Cognitive Organization
The studies discussed up to this point, demonstrated
the effects of the postulated process in terms of the rate
of learning.

Namely, there was a consistent relationship

between the postulated pattern of meaningfulness and the
type of items recalled.

In view of these studies, affective

predication can also be understood as an organizing process
and hence a process comparable to a schematic organization.
Like a schema, affective predication imposes an organization
which is reflected in the pattern of storage in memory as
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well as in terms of its influences on subsequent cognitive
acts.

In view of this point, we can depict the process of

affective predication as imposing a categorical structure
consisting of a very broad designation of "liked meanings"
and "disliked meanings" upon stimuli.

Thus, we would expect

to find similar effects to those obtained for categories
elsewhere in the literature.

For example, Bugaj (1984)

found a clustering of liked traits used by subjects to
characterize an individual.

His results parallel those at-

tained by Hoffman, Mischel and Mazze (1981) and Jefferey and
Mischel (1979) who concluded that traits are organized by
categories. Of course, in Bugaj's study the organizing category was one of affective assessment.

Here, affective pre-

dication functions to organize traits that have a similar
affective relationship according to the subjects' point of
view.
Nguyen (1975) has actually established that affective
predication determines the content of associatively based
categories.

In this experiment, she found that subjects

cluster words according to their RV rating within categories
such as "animals" or "professions."

Furthermore, affective

predication influenced the recall of words within each category as subjects were more likely to recall the liked than
the disliked words in a given category.
Nguyen's findings are consistent with the general proposition that the structure of semantic memory is catego-

38

rical and that the invocation of a category within which an
item is stored facilitates recall.

Thus, Nguyen's study

expands our understanding of memory structure by introducing
a new level of conceptual organization.

Her results

encourage us to look for the "fourth code" not at a
subservient or parallel level to the established categorical
levels, but at a superceding or initiating level.

As such,

her results furnish further evidence that affective assessment is a broad conceptual category involved in the process
of affectively predicating items in terms of their
meaningfulness to an individual.

The effects on learning

obtained in her study as well as the studies that have been
cited are the result of this process --a sequacious meaningextension necessitated by the initial predication of the
items' meaningfulness.

Affective Predication as a Dialectical Process
As discussed in the previous chapter, the predicational model takes into consideration the dialectical nature
of human cognition.

In regard to affective meaningfulness,

the cognitive organization imposed upon items as the result
of the predicational process is bi-polar, meaning that the
postulated categories of "liked" and "disliked" items are
related in such a way that one pole of the meaningfulness
dimension delimits the other.

This bipolarity of the

cognitive organization was demonstrated by Rychlak, Williams
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and Bugaj (1986) and Bugaj and Rychlak (1989).
In the Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (1986) study,
subjects exhibited the RV positive effect when learning the
social descriptors that they had previously assessed as
"liked" as well as when learning the antonyms of the social
discriptors they previously had rated as "disliked".

In the

Bugaj and Rychlak (1989) experiment, subjects rated antonyms
of liked primes negatively and antonyms of disliked primes
positively.

The ratings of synonyms were identical to the

rating of the primes.

Primacy of Affective Predication
As stated previously, the theoretical approach taken
by Rychlak and his associates is to suggest that predication
is a process occurring "from birth."

This means that a

predication initiates (causes) learning rather than derives
from it as an "effect."

The postulated bipolar categories

of "liked" and 'disliked" are believed to be innate and the
process of imposing these categories upon experience occurs
at the protopoint of cognition.

There are three types of

evidence that can be used to support these basic assumptions.
First, if the line of theorizing proposed here is correct, it should be possible to demonstrate that subjects
will rely more on affective assessment (or RV) when their
learnable materials

~

the intellectualized or verbal dis-
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criminants of association value (AV) than when such discriminants obtain. 1

That is, when a learner confronts ma-

terials to which he or she has "no" or "few" associations,
when there is a lack of verbalized knowledge concerning the
task at hand, affective assessment should be relied upon.
Why?

Because this capacity to predicate experience in terms

of an oppositional "liked-disliked" is unlearned.
preferences are based on experience.

Affective

But experience does

not provide the choice as "liked" versus "disliked."

This

rendering of a preference is made by the evaluating
intellect of the person as he or she confronts the "past
experiences" initially -- literally from birth onward.
Hence, it should be possible to design experiments proving
that as specified cognitive associations are weakened,
reliance on affective predication increases.
August and Rychlak (1978) have actually demonstrated
something of this sort in the learning of abstract versus
concrete words among 5th grade pupils.

In this study,

abstract words are analogous to the lower AV of
grams.

eve

tri-

That is, a highly abstract stimulus like "truth"

lacks the concrete associative relations (such as visual
referents) which subjects may employ as a learning heuristic
(Paivio, 1965).

As predicted, RV was found to have a

greater effect when learning abstract (e.g., "truth") than
1

Note: In earlier research on
dimension
of
"like-dislike"
was
"reinforcement value" or "RV."

affective assessment, this
operationally
defined
as
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concrete words (e.g., "tree").
Additional support for this hypothesis comes from
several studies which argue that affective predication is a
native human capacity, and thus a process which begins at
girth.

It was postulated that only later in life, due to

subsequent learning, does an individual begin to rely on
past associative relations.

Therefore, these studies con-

tended, there should be greater reliance on affective predication than on associative relations as a heuristic in
learning among subjects who have less overall schooling.
Consistent with this premise, it was discovered that affective predication plays an even greater role than usual in
learning among younger children (Rychlak, 1975a), persons of
a lower than middle socio-economic class (Rychlak, 1975b)
and the educationally disabled (Woodward, 1978).
The above hypothesis also implies that predication
occurs at the commencement of a cognitive process.

This is

a reflection of the basic tenets of the Kantian model which
postulates the top-down approach to cognition beginning with
the imposition of meaning upon stimuli.
Highly convincing evidence for the postulate that
affective predication occurs at the beginning of a cognitive
process is found in the studies that directly contrast
affective predication with other types of cognitive organization.

Interesting results were obtained by Rychlak's

(1974) study that asked subjects to reverse the learning-
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rate order of RV or AV effects.

Subjects were able to

reverse their AV effect (meaning they were able to learn the
trigrams rated low in associative value first) but not the
RV-positive effect.

Normal subjects could not learn

disliked materials quicker than liked materials, even though
they tried to do so.

Presumably, abnormal subjects would be

unable to learn liked faster than disliked items, though
this was not tested. This study lends further support to the
suggestion that the stimulus materials were affectively
predicated at the initiation of the learning process.

The

affective predication set the meaningful context which
subjects could not negate without reassessing their initial
position in regard to the stimulus materials.

On the other

hand, their ability to reverse the AV effect suggests that
reliance on an associatively derived heuristic does not
create a similarly broad context which dictates the subsequent course of cognitive processing.

Rather, AV seems re-

lates to an ongoing process in which each stimulus is
treated differently.

The Present Experiment
The present study employs a nomothetic approach to
affective predication in contrast to the idiographic one employed in the majority of the previously cited research on
affective assessment.

Tenbrunsel, Nishball and Rychlak

(1968) have shown that a nomothetic measurement of affective
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sment has only a moderate (.54) test-retest reliability
ass es
which was significant at ~=.01, but this study was done
using

eve

trigrams.

The writer believes that the stimulus

materials used in the present study -- i.e., sentences -lend themselves particularly well to the nomothetic approach.
Unlike

eve

trigrams, sentences are intended to convey

certain meanings between individuals who for the sake of
understanding each other have entered a "social contract"
(Rommetveit,1974, cited by O'Connell, 1988).

After all,

communication as well as language (O'Connell, 1988) is a
social phenomenon and therefore a certain degree of intersubjecti vi ty must obtain.

In view of our discussion to this

point, we can speculate that the meaning expressed by a
sentence will have the positive/negative predication which
we theorize is the most fundamental dimension of
meaningfulness, and is one which must be shared by the
individuals engaged in communication with each other.

The

assumption is that the overall positive or negative meaningfulness of the sentence constitutes the broad ground that
will have an effect on the precedent-seguacious course of
cognitive processing.
Given that we have found previous research suggesting
that a person's affective preference (liked/disliked) enters
into his or her learning and memory processes quite early
(at the protopoint), it should be possible to demonstrate
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some thing of the sort in a sentence-learning task.
is, previous studies relied on strings of

That

eve trigrams or

words, either in paired associates or serial position.

The

experimenter could not discern in this process precisely
"where" in the learning process that affective predication
came into play.

The writer believes that through the use of

a sentence procedure it should be possible to demonstrate
that affective assessment will come into play even more so
than a comparison factor such as association value.
For example, let us assume that we were to ask subjects to learn to complete a series of sentences, such as:
When competing with others, John is
In solving problems, John is
When life gets strained, John is
According to the present theoretical analysis, the
initial phrase (i.e. In competing with others) in these
sentences sets the context for the predication of John to
follow (sequacious meaning extension).

If, an ending of the

sort "In competing with others, John is fearless" is
considered "positive" and an ending of the sort "In solving
problems, John is slow" proves "negative" in meaningfulness,
then we have the basis for making a prediction. That is,
based on previous research findings, we predict that the
word "fearless" would be learned more readily in completing
these sentences that the word "slow."
But even more importantly, we should find that when a
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subject cannot recall the specific words "fearless" and/or
"slow" he or she should be able to give us the affective
quality of the sentence completion.

Furthermore, a subject

who cannot recall "fearless" should be able to guess that
the word not yet learned has a positive meaning more readily
than he or she will recall the negativity of the sentence
completion requiring "slow."
the same

In other words, we should see

"positive RV effect" in the presaged meaning-

extension that we saw in the recall of eve trigrams and
words in earlier research.

If people really do rely upon

affective assessment as a very basic --literally pre-verbal-form of predication we should expect to find such differences in their anticipated learning efforts.
As a comparison to the affective predication procedure
we might ask a different group of subjects to guess at the
actual word meaning through use of a similar or synonymous
word.

For example, a subject who could not recall the word

"fearless" might recall another word such as "courageous."
Would this capacity to think of words similar to the one
being learned compare favorably to the capacity to guess the
affective quality of the sentence even before a word is attempted?

It should be possible to assess the relative suc-

cess rate of affective guesses (akin to RV) and similar word
guesses (akin to AV).

Based on previous research and the

theory under development we would expect the affective guesses to be more prevalent and more accurate than the similar

word guesses.
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CHAPTER V
METHOD
Hypotheses
(1) Subjects in a sentence completion task will anticipate the affective quality of words completing a positive sentence more readily than words completing a negative
sentence.
Rationale. The vast preponderance of research on
affective assessment establishes that subjects who are not
specifically selected for a proclivity to predicate their
experience negatively will predicate the learning task positively.

Thus, random groups of college students invariably

reflect a positive affective learning style.

We therefore

expect our subjects to behave in a comparable fashion.
Hence, we predict that they will anticipate correctly more
positive than negative sentence qualities even though they
cannot recall the specific word completing this sentence.
(2) Subjects in a sentence completion task will be
more likely to think of synonyms to words completing a
positive sentence than words completing a negative sentence.
Rationale.

The same theoretical reasoning applied to

hypothesis 1 holds here.

Previous research demonstrates
47
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that subjects learn lists of words more readily if these
words are liked than if they are disliked.
think

Although we

affective assessment is the basic factor determining

such learning dynamics, we expect to find affective preference reflected in actual word guesses.

subjects will

guess more correctly along a positive than a negative
dimension of meaning.
(3) Subjects will reflect a higher percentage of
correct guesses when they are trying to name the affective
quality of the missing word completions than when they are
guessing similar words to these completions.
Rationale.

Since it is our view that affective as-

sessment is among the most fundamental or basic predications
made in human learning, it follows that the scores issuing
from affective guessing should be more plentiful and
accurate than scores issuing from the word guesses.
Obviously, the task confronting the subject who has to guess
similar words involves both affective predication and
additional factors in the learning process.

We believe

these additional factors do involve predication as well; but
since there is an obvious complexity added to the task, a
subject may be expected to do more poorly in guessing words
than in guessing affective quality alone.
(4) Subjects in the sentence completion task will be
able to recall words completing the positive sentences more
readily than the words completing the negative sentences.
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Bationale.

This hypothesis pertains to a manipulation

check on the positive affective assessment's facilitation of
learning discussed in rationale for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2.

We expect that subjects will reach the learning

criterion of two errorless trials of an entire list of sentences by providing correct sentence completions for
positive sentences in fewer trials than for negative sentences.

Results in the predicted direction will lend

additional support for our hypothesis that affective predication is employed by the subjects in this learning task.
Subjects.
Seventy undergraduates

fulfilling requirements for

the introductory psychology course at Loyola University of
Chicago were assigned to the between group conditions using
the randomized blocks procedure (Shaughnessy & Zechmeister,
1985).

Twenty other subjects were used to pretest the

experimental material.

Out of these, 6 served to pre-rate

sentences and another 3 pre-rated the stems of the sentences.

Another group of 5 individuals was recruited to rate

the subjects' responses.

These individuals were blind to

the experimental hypotheses and the identity of the subjects.
Experimental Tasks
Following the presentation of complete sentences
during an initial learning trial (see below), the principle
task employed in this study required subjects to provide an
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omitted predicate (e.g., "graceful") of a sentence cued by
the stem of that sentence (e.g., "In athletics, John

'
1S
••••

II

If a subject failed to do so within 5 seconds or had
provided an incorrect predicate, he/she was prompted to
perform one of the two following tasks depending upon the
between-subjects condition he/she was assigned to: (a) guess
the affective valence of the omitted predicate by stating
whether it was

"positive" or "negative," within 15 seconds

of the prompt; (b) suggest a similar word to the omitted
predicate within 15 seconds of the prompt.

These test

trials continued until a subject reached a learning
criterion of two errorless trials.

Apparatus
All testing was done using an IBM PC personal computer
with a gray monochrome monitor and the original (i.e., 10
function keys layout) IBM PC keyboard.
A program

was written specifically for the purposes

of this experiment.

During a learning trial the program

presented sentences in the following fashion:

The stem

(e.g., "In athletics, John is ••. ") was presented first on
the upper left hand side of the screen for 2 seconds, and
the predicate (e.g., "graceful") was presented next on the
upper right hand side of the screen for another 2 seconds.
Thus, the stem was on the screen for a total of 4 seconds,
with the last 2 seconds appearing together with the word
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completing the sentence.

The order of sentence presentation

was randomized and there was no delay between items on the
list.
Between the learning trial and the first test trial, a
message "Now try to complete these sentences" appeared for 5
seconds.

During the test trials, the stems of the sentences

were presented as before.

A timer appeared right above

where the predicates were located during the learning trial.
The timer was set to 5 seconds, and counted down to zero,
reflecting the time given to subjects to start their response.

A message "Please press enter to continue" was

placed right below where the predicates appeared during the
learning trial.

The order of stem presentation was ran-

domized for each test trial.
The timer stoped as soon as a subject began to enter
his/her response.

The program waited until a subject

pressed the "enter" key to proceed further.

Once, a subject

pressed the "enter" key the program compared the response to
the correct answer.

No discrepancy between the response and

the correct answer was tolerated by the program, thus
subjects were instructed to check their spelling and
allowance was made for misspelling when reviewing subjects'
protocols (see below).
If the response matched the correct predicate, the
program flashed a "Good Job!" message in the center of the
screen for 2 seconds and moved to the next item on the list.
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Thus, there was a 1-second delay between items on the test
trials.

If the list was exhausted, the program presented a

message "This is an end of a trial ••• ," toward the bottom
center of the screen.

The duration of this message was 2

seconds, thus signifying the between-test trial delay.

The

program self terminated after two consecutive errorless test
trials (see below for the discussion of the trial to criterion scores).
If a subject's response did not match the correct
predicate, or if the time expired before a subject made an
entry, the course of the program depended on the experimental condition the subject was assigned to.
If a subject was assigned to the condition that required him/her to state the affective valence of the predicate, a prompt "Is this word Positive or Negative; enter P
or N" appeared in the left-center of the screen.

A prompt

"Press enter to continue" then appeared below the previous
prompt.

The timer was set to 10 seconds.

Once, a subject

pressed "enter" or if the time ran out, the program moved to
the next item.
If a subject was assigned to the condition that required him/her to provide a similar word, a prompt

"Similar

word:" appeared in the left-center of the screen, and a
prompt "Press enter to continue" right below it.
was reset to 10 seconds.

The timer

Once, a subject entered his/her

response, or if the time expired, the program moved to the
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next item.

Independent Variables
The between subjects independent variables in this
study were the experimental conditions defined by the task
performed by subjects when they failed to provide a correct
predicate on a test trial.

As stated above, one group of

subjects was asked to state the affective valence of an
omitted predicate.

This group is ref erred to as the

Affective Judgment condition.

The second group was in-

structed to provide a similar word to the omitted predicate.
This group is referred to as the Similarity Judgment
condition.

The instructions given to these groups are cited

below in the procedure section.

These group variables were

used in all analyses of variance preformed to test the above
hypotheses.
For the test of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 the types of
sentences were differentiated in terms of the stem-predicate
combinations.

Thus, we have two within subjects variables:

affective valence of the stem (positive or negative) and the
affective valence of the word completion (also positive or
negative).

The interception of these variables defined the

type of sentences presented to the subjects.

For instance,

the stem "In athletics, John is .•• " was rated as positive
(see below in the "Material" section for the rating procedure), while the stem "On a rainy day, John is ••• " was rated
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as negative.

Thus, a positive stem (e.g., "In athletics,

John is ... ") combined with a positive predicate (such as
"graceful") resulted in a positive stem-positive predicate
(PP) sentence (i.e., "In athletics, John is graceful"),
which had an overall positive rating.

By combining a

negative stem (e.g., "On a rainy day, John is ... ") with a
negative predicate (e.g., "sad") the negative stem, negative
predicate sentences (NN) were derived, which had an overall
negative valence.

Other possible stem-predicate

combinations were also used.

Thus, there were positive

stem, negative predicate or "PN" sentences

(e.g., "In

athletics, John is clumsy.") that had an overall negative
valence, and the negative stem, positive predicate or "NP"
sentences (e.g., "On a rainy day, John is happy.") that had
overall positive valence.
The reason for this more precise differentiation of
the sentence types than was mentioned in hypotheses 1, 2,
and 3 was because we wanted to test for a possibility that
the stem-predicate combinations by themselves could have
influenced the subjects' responses.

This situation posed

the most serious threat in the Affective Judgment condition,
in which subjects were instructed to provide the affective
valence of the omitted predicates.

It was theoretically

possible that subjects could have relied on the valence of
the stem to guess the affective valence of the predicate.
Thus the test of hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 involved comparisons
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between types of stem (positive or negative), types of word
completion for these stems (positive and negative) and also
the between subjects variable (Affective Judgment and
Similarity Judgment conditions).

To test the hypothesis

4 1 only the overall affective valence of the sentences was

used to operationalize the within-subjects variable.

As

such, the test of hypothesis 4 is a comparison between the
sets of positive and negative sentences and the group
variables.

Dependent variables
Trials to criterion scores:

The first dependent variable

under consideration was the trials to criterion score,
defined as the number of test trials that it took a subject
to reach two errorless trials for the list.
less trials were included in the score.

The two error-

For example, if a

subject did not make an error for any of the positive
sentences after the third trial, his/her trials to criterion
score for the positive sentences would have been "5."

If

the same subject made the last error on any of the negative
sentences on the fourth trial, his/her trial to criterion
score for the negative sentences would have been

11

6."

The

analysis of this variable constituted a test of hypothesis
4.

To clarify this scoring, let us consider an experimental protocol of an imaginary subject named Sampson.
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Assume, Sampson had completed the task in seven trials.
That is, he made errors on the first five trials, but by the
sixth trial, he correctly anticipated all the words in all
the sentences and this carried over to the seventh trial as
well.

Also, assume that on the fifth trial, Sampson made an

error only for a negative sentence, while the last error for
a positive sentence occurred on the fourth trial.

Thus, his

trials to criterion score for negative sentences was
"seven," but for postive sentences "six."
As was noted above, the computer program did not
tolerate any descrepancy between the responses and correct
answers.

Cases where the review of subject's protocol

indicated that an initial incorrect response was due to misspelling, were not counted as an error.

These were rare

(seven in all for the total sample) and none of the trials
to criterion scores in the sample had to be adjusted because
of misspelled responses.
Match/error ratio scores:

The second dependent variable was

the "match/error ratio" score that was used to test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.

This represented the number of matches

over the number of errors affording the opportunities to
make a match for a particular type of sentence.
example, if our imaginary subject

For

Sampson failed to

provide a correct word completion to the PP sentences on the
list (e.g., "In athletics, John is graceful.") five times
while reaching the learning criterion, he/she was prompted
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five times to either state the affective valence of these
sentences, or to enter a similar word.

The operationa-

lization of the "match" varied according to the betweensubject condition and is discussed below.

Since the number

of opportunities was expected to vary due to individual differences in learning the experimental material, and due to
the variations in learning expected under hypothesis 4, the
number of "matches" was divided by the number of opportunities to make a match, yielding a ratio score.

This

score was computed for each type of the sentence (PP, NP,
NN, PN) and was used to test hypotheses 1,2 and 3.
Scoring for the Affective Judgment condition was as
follows:

Any time a subject could not recall a word com-

pleting a sentence, but, when prompted to do so, was able to
correctly state the affective quality of that word
completion, the response was considered to be a match.
Suppose Sampson had attempted to answer the stems "In
athletics, John

.

1S •••

I

"

"When solving problems, John

is •.. ," "When competing with others, John is •.. ," all of
which are positive stems. (see Table 1 below)

Furthermore,

suppose that each of these stems was completed by a positive
predicate (e.g "graceful," "fast," and "active" respectively), thus deriving positive stem-positive predicate (PP)
sentences.

If it took Sampson five trials to reach the

learning criterion of two consecutive trials, these PP
sentences were presented to him/her 15 times.
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Assume that in these 15 times the sentences were
presented, Sampson failed to provide a correct word completion on five occasions.

For instance, he failed to answer

all three stems on the first trial; the stem "In athletics,
John is .•. "on the second trial; and the stem "When competing with others, John is ... " on the third trial.

Each time,

Sampson failed to provide a correct word completion, the
computer program prompted him to state the affective valence
of the word completion, whether it was positive or negative.
Thus, in this example, Sampson was prompted to state the
affective valence of the sentences five times.

If he ans-

wered correctly three out of five times by entering P for
"positive,"

his match/error ratio score for PP sentences

would be 3/5 or .60.
If the subject did not make an error for a particular
type of sentence (for instance, the same subject answered
all negative stems that were completed by a positive word,
i.e., NP sentences), a score of 1.00 was assigned.
As was noted above, misspelled responses were not
counted as an error and thus, were droped from consideration
in calculating the match-ratio scores.

Considering

the infrequency of their occurrence, their possible effect,
if any, on the match-ratio scores was negligible.
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Table 1
Positive and Negative Sentence Sterns

Positive sterns

Negative sterns

1 When competing with others

When life gets tense

2 When eating

When bad things are likely

3 When watching a movie

If fault is assigned

4 When it comes to money

When others are rude

5 When attending a party

In dangerous situations

6 If schedule must be kept

When others are in trouble

7 In solving problems

On a rainy day
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In scoring for the Similarity Judgment condition, a
match was defined in terms of the agreement between four out
of five raters who judged the semantic relatedness of the
subjects' responses; that is the particular stem they used
with the predicate.

For example,

when asked to provide a

similar word to the predicate "passive" completing the stem
"When competing with others, John is ••. " the subjects
responded with "slow," "vicious," "not motivated" and so on.
The raters were given the complete sentence (e.g., "When
competing with others, John is passive.") and the list of
all responses to that particular stem given by the subject
in question.

The raters were instructed to state if a given

response could be used in that sentence without altering the
meaning of the sentence (see Appendix A for the actual
instructions given to these raters).

For example, can the

words "not motivated" be substituted for "passive" without
changing the meaning of the sentence "When competing with
others, John is passive." conveys?

If four out of five

raters agreed that "not motivated" could be used in lieu of
"passive" in that sentence, this response ("not motivated")
was scored as a match for the subject or subjects who made
it.
As in the Affective Judgment condition, the derived
score for the Similarity Judgment condition was the number
of matches over number of opportunities to make a match.
a subject did not make an error for a particular type of

If
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sentence, a score of 1.00 was assigned.

Instances where a

subject failed to respond to the prompt to provide a similar
word were scored as "no match."

If a subject provided a

correct sentence completion in place of a similar word
despite explicit instructions to the contrary, this completion was considered an error.

As before, subjects were not

penalized for misspelling words.

Material
This study used two lists of 14 sentences (see Appendix B).

The first list contained four sentences with posi-

tive stems and positive word completions (PP), three sentences with positive stems and negative word completions
(PN), three sentences with negative stems and positive word
completions (NP), and four sentences with negative stem and
negative word completions (NN).

The second list contained

three PP sentences, four PN sentences, four NP sentences and
three NN sentences.

Thus both lists had seven positive

sentences and seven negative sentences.

There were two

forms of lists arranged (A and B) and subjects were randomly
assigned to work with either list A or B.
The two lists were assembled using the following
procedure:

Initially, two preliminary lists were made with

each sentence consisting of a stem (e.g., "When competing
with others John is •.• ") and a word completion (e.g.,
"active").

If a positive word completion was used in the
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list A (i.e., "active") its antonym was used in the list B
(e.g., "passive").

Thus, lists A and B mirrored each other

in terms of the affective connotations of the word completions.
Each list was given to a different group of three
raters for their judgment.

The raters were instructed to

judge the meaningfulness of the sentences as positive or
negative. (see Appendix C for the instructions given to
these raters). They made their responses by circling the
letter "P" if they thought a sentence was positive, or the
letter "N" if they thought that the sentence was negative.
These letters were at the end of each sentence and their
order was randomized to control for response bias.
In addition, the raters were asked to generate as many
synonyms as they could for the adjectives of the sentences
within one minute.

The adjectives were underlined so that

they would be easily recognized by the raters.
A sentence and its variant were included on the experimental lists only if both met the following criteria:
1) All three raters agreed on the positive or negative
meaningfulness of a sentence.
2) All three raters generated at least three words
that were similar in meaning to the predicate of

the

sentence.
The latter criterion is a precaution against using words
that have few readily accessible associates, hence biasing
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the results in favor of the Affective Judgment condition.
originally, the design called for eight sentences to
be used in this manner, but pre-testing showed that subjects
were able to learn this list in two trials.

This situation

forced us to expand the lists and decrease the time of their
presentation on the learning trial.

As such, all 14

sentences that met the above criteria were used.
Once the sentences were selected using this procedure,
its stems (14 in all) were given to another group of raters
to judge for their affective meaningfulness.
similar to that used
employed.

A procedure

with the rating of sentences was

An example of the instructions given to these

raters is presented in Appendix D.

This was done to

determine the type of stem-predicate combination a given
stem was involved in (see above for a discussion of the
possible bias due to the variations in the stem-predicate
combinations).

Again, an agreement between three raters was

required to retain a given stem on the lists.

All 14 stems

met this criterion.
Unfortunately, this selection process resulted in the
uneven number of stem-word completion combinations.

Pre-

testing also revealed that dropping the number of sentences
to 12 would make this task considerably easier.

There were

no more available sentences to increase the number to 16.
This disparity was not a crucial blow to the design since
the score most likely to be affected by this inequality --
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the match/error score was a ratio score already due to other
considerations (see above).

Thus, since the only way this

inequality could effect the results was by affording more
opportunities to provide correct word completions to a group
of stem-word combinations, the use of ratio scores preempted
this criticism.

This was the case because what was compared

was the proportion of matches rather than the actual number
of correct guesses of affective quality of word completions
or the actual number of words similar to the word completions.

In regard to the trial to criterion scores, this

disparity could be considered a factor, since the analysis
of this score did not make differentiations in terms of
stem-word combinations.

The number of positive and negative

sentences was equal at seven.
The word completions for these sentences were also
checked for appearance in the standing language structure
using Thorndike and Lorge (1944) norms.
in the Appendix B.

These are presented

Except for one pair of word completions

(active [rating A] and passive [rating 7]) all other word
completions for a given sentence were equal in terms of
their word frequencies.

Procedure
Testing was conducted individually in a small laboratory room with the experimenter present to assist with the
operations of the IBM personal computer and to answer ques-
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tions pertaining to the instructions.

Each subject was

scheduled at least 10 minutes after the previous subject was
expected to complete the task.
Subjects were told that this experiment was a learning
task that involved memorizing a list of sentences and that
it was not a test of their competence.

They were further

informed that they were free to discontinue the experiment
at any point they wished without incurring any penalty.
Following their informed consent, subjects were asked
if they ever had worked on a computer.

The "enter" key was

pointed out to all subjects, and they were asked to press
the key several times to familiarize themselves with its
location.
The procedure was first demonstrated by the experimenter using sentences

"In athletics, John is graceful,"

and "When it comes to dancing, John is clumsy."

Subjects

were not informed regarding the affective valence of these
sentences, or the word-completions.

The order of presenta-

tion was randomized by the program, but for the sake of
clarity, the above order will be used in this discussion.
Before the sentences appeared on the computer screen,
subjects were told that this was an example of a learning
trial and they were to try to memorize the sentence that
would appear.

At this time, the task of providing the

omitted predicate was explained to the subjects.

Subjects

were also informed that the actual list would be much longer
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and that only one learning trial would be used during the
actual experiment, though correct responses would be given
if they made a mistake.
Following the demonstration of the learning trial, the
demonstration of the test trial began.

Only the stem ap-

peared on the screen, along with a timer counting down from
five seconds.

The experimenter entered the first letter of

the predicate "graceful" to illustrate that the timer would
stop once a subject began to enter a word.

The screen loca-

tions of the stem, the timer, as well as the location where
subjects' entry would appear were pointed out.

The ex-

perimenter proceeded to misspell the predicate (e.g., "grcful"). Subjects were told that this task was not a test of
their typing ability and were shown how to change the spelling of the word using the backspace key.
structed not to change the word itself.

They were also inOnce the spelling

of the word was corrected, the experimenter pressed the
"enter" key.

The program responded with a

"good job!" mes-

sage appearing on the screen.
When, the next sentence stem

("When it comes to

dancing, John is ..• ") appeared on the screen, the experimenter stopped the timer by entering a random set of
digits in lieu of the word completion,
intentional error.

thus committing an

At this point, the tasks required of the

subjects after they had failed to provide a correct predicate were explained.

67

For the Affective Judgment condition, subjects were
instructed to guess the affective quality of the word they
could not recall by typing in
prompt.

11

P 11 or "N" at the program

The experimenter then asked the subjects what

letter (P or N) he should enter.
For the Similarity Judgment condition

subjects were

instructed to type in the first word coming to mind that
they thought was similar to the one they could not recall.
Again, subjects were informed that the timer would stop as
soon as they started typing.

Subjects were also asked not

to change the word once they started typing, and not to
enter the correct word if they happened to remember it on
the second try.

All these admonitions were conveyed during

this demonstration.
Following this demonstration by the experimenter, subjects were asked to practice the procedure using the same
two warm up sentences for at least three test trials.

After

their questions were answered, the actual experiment began.
The subjects were debriefed after they had completed the
full experimental procedure.

CHAPTER VI
RESULTS
Trials to Criterion Scores
The first dependent variable in this experiment was
the trials to criterion scores.

The raw data of these

scores are presented in Appendix E.

As the reader may re-

call, this score signified the number of trials it took a
subject to reach the criterion of two errorless trials
(including the two errorless trials) for each type of
sentence (positive and negative).

A higher value of this

score indicated more trials were needed to learn a sublist
of a particular type of sentences.

These scores were in-

tended to test hypothesis 4, which predicted that postive
sentences would be easier to learn than negative sentences;
thus, it would take fewer trials to reach criterion for
positive sentences than for negative sentences.
The trials to criterion scores were analyzed with 2
between-subjects (task: Affective Judgment versus Similarity
Judgment) by 2 within-subjects (type of sentence: positive
versus negative) repeated measures analysis of variance
(ANOVA).

The BMDP2V program was used to compute the ANOVA.

The ANOVA source table is presented in Table 2 and the means
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and standard deviations are cited in Table 3.

The

inequality of the number of subjects was due to the software
failure described above.

This inequality was random, and

was taken into account as such by the computational program.
As shown by Table 2, the ANOVA yielded no significant
main effect, nor interactions.

Consequently, we are unable

to reject a null hypothesis framed in terms of hypothesis 4.
No advantage was found for positive over negative affective
assessment.

Match-Ratio Scores
The second dependent variable in this experiment was
the match-ratio scores (see Appendix E for raw data).

As

noted above, the match-ratio scores were computed by dividing the number of matches by the total number of opportunities to make a match (i.e., the sum of matches and nonmatches).

Thus, the match-ratio scores represented the

subjects' accuracy in either stating the correct affective
quality of a sentence completion in the Affective Judgment
condition, or providing a word similar to the sentence completion in the Similarity Judgment condition.

The higher

values of the match-matio scores signified greater accuracy
in the latter judgments.
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Table 2
source Table For the Analysis of Variance
of Trials to Criterion Scores

source of

Sum of

variance

Squares

Mean
Square

Judgment
Condition

5.49

1

5.49

Error(l)

167.47

44

3.81

0.21

1

0.2

0.19

Condition

0.47

1

0.47

0.43

Error(2)

48.75

44

1.11

1.4

ns

Sentence
Type

ns

Sentence
Type X
Judgment
ns
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for
Trial to Criterion Scores

Experimental conditions

mean

std. dv.

Af f ectiye Judgment
Sentence type
Positive

4.68

1.75

Negative

4.92

1.66

Positive

4.33

1.32

Negative

4.29

1.45

Similarity Judgment
Sentence type
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The match-ratio scores were used to test hypotheses 1,
2, and 3.

The independent variables involved in the test

of these hypothesis were the affective valence of the
sentence stems (positive or negative), the affective valence
of the word completions (positive or negative) and the
judgment tasks (Affective Judgment and Similarity Judgment).
The match-ratio scores were submitted to a 2 between
(judgment task: Affective Judgment versus Similarity Judgment) by 2 within (affective valence of the stems: positive
versus negative) by 2 within (affective valence of the word
completions: positive versus negative) repeated measures
ANOVA.

The ANOVA was computed using the BMDP2V program.

The source table for this ANOVA is presented in Table 4, and
means and standard deviations for the independent variables
are presented in Table 5.

As noted above, the inequality

in the number of subjects for Affective Judgment and
Similarity Judgment conditions was due to software failures,
and thus was a random effect, accounted for by the computational program.
Since the match-ratio scores were proportions, they
were transformed using an arcsine transformation to equate
the distance between the data points (see Winer, 1971).
These transformed match-ratio scores were submitted to the
same ANOVA as the raw match-ratio scores.

The source table

for the ANOVA of transformed match-ratio scores is presented
in Table 6.

The transformed means and standard deviations
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for the independent variables are cited in Table 7.
As can be seen in Table 4, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect only for the judgment task variables
(£(1,44]=8.87, n >.005)

The same pattern of results was ob-

tained for the transformed scores. (£(1,44]=8.40,

n >.001) (see Table 6).

Since, the raw match-ratio scores

are more discriptive of the subjects' performance than the
transformed match-ratio scores, and the significant pattern
of results was identical for nontransformed and transformed
scores, the results will be discussed in terms of raw matchratio scores.
Thus, the obtained results indicate that on the
average, subjects in the Affective Judgment condition
were more likely to accurately state the affective valence
of the word completions than subjects in the Similarity
Judgment condition were able to provide a similar word (X
(Affective Judgment) =.741 >-X (Similarity Judgment) =485).
Thus, the results lend support only to hypothesis 3 by
showing the predicted difference between the Affective
Judgment and the Similarity Judgment conditions.
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Table 4
Source Table for the Analysis of Variance of
Raw Match-Ratio Scores

Sum of
source
of Variance Squares
Judgment
Task

D.F. Mean
Squares

2.97

1

8.87

.0047

14.75

44

.34

Sentence Stem

.03

1

.03

.30

ns

Sentence Stem
by Judgment
Task

.05

1

.05

.48

ns

Error Term

4.21

44

.09

Word
Completion

.08

1

.08

.55

ns

word Completion
by Judgment
Task

.17

1

.17

1.16

ns

Error Term

6.62

44

.15

Sentence
Completion
by Word
Completion

.02

1

.02

.22

ns

Sentence
Completion
by Word
Completion
by Judgment
Task

.18

1

.18

2.14

ns

Error Term

3.66

44

.08

Error Term

2.97

.E
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for
Raw Match Ratio Scores

Experimental Groups

Mean

Std. Dev.

Affective Judgment

.788

.318

Similarity Judgment

.440

.449

Affective Judgment

.686

.418

Similarity Judgment

.587

.467

Affective Judgment

.712

.352

Similarity Judgment

.426

.476

Affective Judgment

.776

.311

Similarity Judgment

.488

.469

1) Positive Stem, Positive
Word Completion

2) Positive Stem, Negative
Word Completion

3) Negative Stem, Positive
Word Completion

4) Negative Stem, Negative
Word Completion
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Table 6
The Source Table of the Analysis of Variance
of the Transformed Match-Ratio Scores

source of
Variance

Judgment
Task

Sum of
Mean
Squares
D.F. Square

27.16

1

27.16

8.4

.0001

Error

142.34

44

3.23

Sentence Stem

.22

1

22

.25

ns

Sentence Stem
by Judgment
Task

.27

1

.27

.30

ns

Error

39.67

44

.90

Word
Completion

.84

1

.84

.60

ns

Word
Completion
by Judgment
Task

1.92

1

1.92

1.35

ns

Error

62.44

44

1.42

Sentence Stem
by Word
Completion

.14

1

.14

.18

ns

Sentence Stem
by Word
Completion by
Judgment Task

1.33

1

1.33

1.77

ns

Error

33.35

44

.75
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviation for
the Transformed Match-Ratio Scores

Experimental Groups

Mean

Std.Dev.

Affective Judgment

2.46

.95

Similarity Judgment

1.39

1.40

Affective Judgment

2.17

1.31

Similarity Judgment

1.85

1.46

Affective Judgment

2.24

1. 06

Similarity Judgment

1.36

1.49

Affective Judgment

2.41

.92

similarity Judgment

1.59

1.43

1) Positive Stem, Positive

Word Completion

2) Positive Stem, Negative

Word Completion

3) Negative Stem, Negative

Word Completion

4) Negative Stem, Negative

Word Completion
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As one may recall, hypothesis 1 predicted that subjects in the Affective Judgment condition would be more
accurate in guessing the affective valence of a word completing a positive sentence than a word completing a negative sentence.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that subjects in the

similarity Judgment condition would be more likely to
provide a word similar to a word completing a positive
sentence than to a word completing a negative sentence.
Since, the word completion of a sentence determined the
affective quality of a sentence, these hypotheses predicted
a main effect for the word completion variables where the
accuracy for positive word completion would be greater than
the accuracy for negative sentences for both Affective
Judgment and Similarity Judgment conditions.
Since no main effect for the word completion variable
was obtained, the results did not support hypotheses 1 and
2.

According to these results, contrary to prediction of

hypothesis 1, subjects in the Affective Judgment condition
were no more likely to accurately state the affective
valence of the words completing the positive sentences than
those completing the negative sentences.

Contrary to the

prediction of hypothesis 2, in the Similarity Judgment
condition, subjects were no more likely to provide a word
similar to one completing a positive sentence than to one
completing a negative sentence.
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Chi Sguare Analyses
chi Sguare of Match Freguencies in Affective Judgment
~ondition.

An argument can be made that the pattern of

scores obtained in support of hypothesis 3, were due to the
limitation of the response alternatives for the Affective
Judgment condition, while no such limitation existed for the
Similarity Judgment condition.

Namely, the subjects in the

Affective Judgment condition were presented with two
alternatives for a response -- "P" for "positive," or "N"
for negative.

On the other hand, subjects in the Similarity

Judgment condition who had to generate their own responses
were faced with a potentially unlimited number of
alternatives.

Thus, it could be argued that the difference

in match-ratio scores between the Affective Judgment condition and the Similarity Judgment condition was due to the
higher probability of subjects in the Affective Judgment
condition arriving at a "correct" response.
This argument was already taken into consideration in
the procedure of selecting sentences for this experiment.
That is, we required that the raters provide at least three
synonyms to word completions of all the sentences selected,
thus increasing the probability of a similar response being
available.

An additional counter-argument can be made by

presenting evidence that the pattern of responses obtained
for the Affective Judgment condition was not due to chance
alone.

Since, the subjects in this condition were faced
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with dichotomous alternatives, the chance probability is
thus .5 or 50%.
To test that the match scores for Affective Judgment
condition were not obtained by chance alone, a chi square
was performed comparing the observed frequency of matches
(because there was no effect for the word completion and the
sentence stem variables: both positive and negative matches
were summed together) with the value expected under the probability of .5 (or 50%) to make a match.
used are presented below in Table 8.

The frequencies

The analysis yielded'):

2 (1, H= 131)= 11.62, which was significant at R<.01.

Thus, we can conclude that the pattern of match-ratio
scores obtained for the Affective Judgment condition was not
due to chance alone.

Since, we can now begin to rule out

the possibility that the subjects simply guessed the
affective quality of the word completion, we have evidence
to suggest that the obtained pattern of results for matchratio scores in the Affective Judgment condition reflects
the postulated ability to anticipate the affective quality
of the word completions, and hence, lends support to the
predicational model presented above.

Here, we find evidence

that the affective predication of the sentence completion
had an effect, beyond that expected due to chance alone.
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Table 8
Observed and Expected Freguencies for Matches
for the Affective Judgment Condition

observed Frequency of Matches ••••...•••• 85
Expected Frequency of Matches .....•••... 65.5

Observed Frequency of Nonmatches ..••.••• 46
Expected Frequency of Nonmatches •.••.... 65.5

Total Number of Observations ...••••...•• 131
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Tbe Cbi Sguare Analysis of Freguencies of "Affective"
Matcbes in Similarity Judgment Condition.

Additional

support for the hypothesis that affective predication had an
effect on the subjects' ability to anticipate the affective
quality of the word completions can be derived by looking at
the correspondence of affective quality of the "similar"
responses provided by subjects in the Similarity Judgment
condition with affective quality of the word completions.
In view of the above discussions of affective predication,
we would expect that the affective predication of the
sentence would determine the generation of the "similar"
responses along the same affective dimension.

For instance,

we would predict that the "similar" responses to a sentence
stem "In solving problems, John is ••. 11 which is completed by
a positive "fast," would also be positive, even when a "similar" response is not related to the actual word completion
in other ways (e.g., "friendly" and/or "brilliant").

Thus,

we would expect the frequency of correspondence between the
affective quality of the "similar" responses with the
affective quality of the sentence completion (i.e., the
frequency of "affective" matches) to be above that expected
by chance alone.

As was the case in the above chi square

analysis, the frequency expected by chance alone would be
50% of all responses.
To test this hypothesis, the same group of raters who
evaluated the subjects' "similar" responses in terms of
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"similarity" with the sentence completions also scored the
subjects' "similar" responses in terms of the affective
dimensions of "positive" and "negative."

The instructions

given to these raters were as follow:
"Please indicate if you think that the following
items are positive or negative in meaning by
checking off "P" for positive and "N" for negative.

Please rate items one at a time, and go

by your first impression."
As was the case for "similarity" judgment, the correspondence between the affective valence assigned to a
subject's response by four or more raters, and the affective
valence of the word completion of a sentence to which the
response was made, defined an "affective" match.
For instance, assume that a subject responded with
"wonderful" when cued with the stem "When solving problems,
John is •.• ,"

but the actual word completion here was

suppose to be "fast."

The word "fast" was positive.

If

four or more judges rated "wonderful" as positive, then we
would consider "wonderful" to affectively match "fast," despite the fact that there is no other apparent semantic
relationship between them.
These "affective" match scores were analyzed with a
chi square to see if their frequency was significantly
different from the value expected by a chance probability of
50

%.

The frequencies analyzed are presented in Table 9.

An analysis yielded a
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X

2 ( 2, lf=92 )=21. 04, p,. <. 01.

Based on this analysis, we can conclude that the
frequency of "affective" matches was not due to chance
alone.

These results further support the counter-argument

made in the previous section.

Not only can we conclude that

subjects were able to state the affective quality of the
sentence completions when directly asked to do so in the
Affective Judgment condition, but now we also have an indirect measure of the same effect.

Thus, we have addi-

tional evidence in support of the predicational model
proposed under test.
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Table 9
Observed and Expected Frequencies for Affective Matches
For the Similarity Judgment Condition

Observed Frequency of Matches ••••••...•• 68
Expected Frequency of Matches .•••••••••• 46

Observed Frequency of Nonmatches •...•••• 24
Expected Frequency of Nonmatches ••••••.• 46

Total Number of Observations ••.••.•••••• 92

CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION
The main finding of this study is the difference
between group match scores; as predicted in hypothesis 3.
Subjects were more likely to anticipate the affective
quality of the predicate than to provide a similar word.

In

view of the theoretical framework laid out in Chapters III
and IV, these results indicate that a subject knew the
affective sense of the predicate before the exact word was
learned.

This, conclusion is further supported by the trend

in the subjects' responses to provide an affectively similar
word to the actual predicate in the Similarity Judgment
condition as indicated by the chi square analysis of
frequency of "affective" matches.

The affective quality

thus represents a broad organizing structure that allows one
to draw the relationship between items, even when no other
relationship exists.
For example, in some cases, the similar responses were
word completions of other sentences having the same
affective quality.

This pattern of errors further supports

the notion that the items were predicated in terms of their
affective quality, and hence, are more likely to be inter86
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changed within the same affective context regardless of the
specifics of their meaning.

On the other hand, the specific

relations between words may become apparent only after the
word is put into the context which it shares with a limited
number of other similar items.

Affect may be too broad of a

conceptual category to bring these relationships out.

Thus,

if the learning is a top-to-bottom process as it is claimed
here, one would be cognizant of the affective quality of the
words before they would be aware of the specific relations
which facilitate the ability to state a similar word.
As was noted above, one may argue that the limitation
of response alternatives for the Affective Judgment condition to positive and negative versus the potentially unlimited number of possible responses for the Similarity
Judgment condition had an effect.

Thus, the results ob-

tained are the reflection of a fact that in the subjects in
the Affective Judgment condition had at least a 50% chance
of responding correctly (matching the actual affective valence of the sentence completion) while for the subjects in
the Similarity Judgment condition, the chance of providing a
similar word would be smaller.

This is a formidable chal-

lenge, but it was countered in three ways, and here the
fourth will be suggested.

First, the selection criterion

for the sentences that required the raters to provide at
least three similar words to the predicate of a sentence
partly meets this criticism by insuring that each word used
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had readily available alternatives.

Second, given that the

frequency of matches in Affective Judgment condition was
well above that expected by chance alone (as was indicated
by the chi square analysis), we can conclude that the
performance of subjects in the Affective Judgment condition
reflects more than mere guessing.

Third, subjects in the

Similarity Judgment condition tended to provide "similar"
responses that were affectively similar to the sentence
completions even when these "similar" responses did not meet
the other criterion of similarity.

As was noted above, this

evidence is another indication that subjects had a "hunch"
about the affective quality of the word completions.
Fourth, the lack of the simple main effect for the
type of sentence variable in the Affective Judgment condition is actually encouraging.

Any pattern of scores other

than those predicted by hypotheses 1 and 2 (i.e., PP=NP>
NN=PN) or its opposite (i.e., PP=NP<NN=PN that would suggest
RV reversal effect), would have indicated that stem-word
combinations had an effect beyond the positive or negative
evaluation of the sentences.

Especially damaging would have

been an interaction in which the scores for PP and NN
sentences were higher than PN and NP scores.

This would

imply that the obtained main effect for the group variable
might have been due to the fact that subjects simply guessed
the affective valence of the predicate based upon the affective valence of the stem.
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A related issue is that the tasks between conditions
differed in terms of difficulty.

In the case of the

Affective Judgment condition, the task simply required the
subjects to indentify the correct response between the presented alternatives (i.e., positive or negative).

In the

case of the Similarity Judgment condition, subjects had to
generate their own responses. This point is well taken and
future research should take into account this distinction by
equating these tasks.

For instance, the subjects in the

Similarity Judgment condition could be given a choice of a
word similar to the actual word and an unrelated word.
Another methodological criticism of these results can
be made in view of the disparity of stem-word combinations,
an unfortunate situation that arose due the selection
processes of the material used in this experiment.
criticism can be countered in two ways.

This

First, the dis-

parity differed between lists, and these were randomly
assigned.

Given that list A had more NP and PN than NN and

PP sentences and list B had more NN and PP than PN and NP
sentences, the average number of stem-predicate combinations
was identical when calculated across lists.

Second, the

match-ratio score was a percentage of correct responses over
the opportunities to make these responses.

The stated

reason why a ratio score was used thus counters this
possible criticism.

The difference in the number of errors

made by

aq~icipated

~~~jects

was

by hypothesis 4 which pre-
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dieted that the negative sentences would be harder to learn
than the positive sentences.

Thus the percentage score was

used to obtain a metric of subjects' performance not influenced by this predicted disparity in the number of
responses for different types of material.

Therefore, the

use of a ratio score should also equate subjects' scores in
this situation where the number of opportunities to make an
error was not equal.
Another objection that can be raised to question
these results concerns the relations between subjects' initial responses and those after the prompt (either to state
the affective quality or to provide a similar word).

One

may postulate that the obtained matches (either in the
Affective Judgment condition or affective matches in Similarity Judgment condition) were the result of subjects
altering their responses following an error and thus were
indicative of the feedback provided by the experimental procedure and not their knowledge of the affective quality per
se.

For instance, a subject could have scored a match by

stating that a word completion was positive after incorrectly responding with a negative word (e.g., dumb) to a
sentence stem "When solving problems, John is _ _.," where
the actual word completion was a positive "fast."
The pattern of scores suggests that such reversals of
affective quality were infrequent.

For in-

stance, out of 85 matches scored in the Affective Judgment
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condition, 52 were made following a failure to respond
within five second (thus following a "blank"), 24 coincided
with the affective quality of the initial erroneous response
(e.g, stating that word completion [e.g., fast] was positive
after initially responding with "smart") and only nine were
the reversals described above.

For affective matches scored

by subjects in the Similarity Judgment condition, 10 were
reversals, 17 coincided with the initial response and 41
were blanks.

Caution should be exercised in interpreting

these findings, since no formal procedure was used to rate
the affective valence of the initial responses.

Even so,

the tendency of subjects not to reverse the affective
valence of their initial responses

suggests that the

feedback given by the experimental procedure was not an
important factor.
Futhermore, this pattern of results lends additional
support to the predicational model.

The contrast between

the frequencies of "reversal" of affective quality following
the initial response and "nonreversal" of affective quality
(9 vs. 24 for the Affective Judgment condition and 10 vs. 17
for the Similarity Judgment condition) suggests that the
initial predication of the affective quality guided both
responses -- the initial response and the response following
the prompt to either state the affective quality of the
sentence completion or to state a similar word.

In fact,

for the Affective Judgment condition, this pattern remained
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even when the subjects' initial impressions were wrong.

For

instance when subjects in the Affective Judgment condition
did not score a match (i.e., responded "negatively" to a
positive sentence), they reversed the affective valence of
their initial responses four times and failed to do so 28
times, thus lending further support to this hypothesis.

The

pattern of responses for Similarity Judgment condition was
not clear, since most failures to score an affective match
came after "blanks," but when these came after erroneous
responses, five were reversals and four were nonreversals.
It is also interesting to note that for all six cases
in the Affective Judgment condition and for the two cases in
the Similarity Judgment condition when the initial response
was an antonym to the actual word completion (e.g., cautious
to careless), subjects did not score a match.

This trend

in subjects' responses is significant in view of the oppositional nature of the predicational process proposed in
Chapters III and IV.

Some antonyms can be viewed as re-

presenting the opposite poles of affective valence as well
being opposite in terms of some dimensions of meaning
(Hampton & Taylor, 1985; Glass, Holyoak & Kriger, 1979;
Herrmann, Chaffin, Conti, Peters & Robbins, 1979).

For

instance "innocent" and "guilty" are opposite in terms of
their affective connotation, but are also opposite in terms
of the representation of the judgment rendered.

Thus, the

relation between antonyms is closer than the relation
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between words opposite solely on the affective dimension
(e.g., cautious and guilty).

In terms of this study, this

suggests that the subjects had an inkling of the meaning of
the actual word, but failed to respond correctly because of
the erroneous affective predication.

The failure to reverse

the initial affective predication in case of antonymy
implies that as postulated by hypothesis 3, affect rather
than meaning played a key role in determining the nature of
the subsequent responses.
The alternative explanation to these results made in
terms of the Lockean tradition would stress the associative
relation between the item and its value label.

In order to

account for the above results, a Lockean model would have to
either a) postulate the salience of the item-affective label
association or b) specify the conditions under which this
relation is salient.

In regard to the first point, there is

no evidence that such is the case.

The value labels per se

(i.e., good, bad, etc.) do not generally appear as high associates on the norms of free association frequencies (see
Palermo & Jenkins, 1964).

In fact, if the process involved

in this task was guided strictly by the associative strength, we would expect a reversal of the results.
On the other hand, a Lockean model may postulate that
the instructions given to the subjects in the Affective
Judgment condition primed the affective labels, thus specifying the condition when the relation with these labels
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ought to be accessible.

Yet, the reverse may be true for

the Similarity Judgment condition.

Thus, the Lockean model

is faced with the challenge of explaining why one type of
priming is superior to another.
Again, given the theoretical tenets of the Lockean
tradition, one would have to rely on the mediational mode of
explanation.

For instance, one can speculate that the

associative links between items and affective nodes are at a
higher level in the associative network.

This type of post

hoc explanation relying on the level in the associative
network was used by Glass, Holyak and Kriger (1979) in
interpreting antonymy effects.
Citing the hierarchical levels in the network could
also account for the trend that in the Similarity Judgment
condition, subjects tended to provide words with the same
affective valence as those actually completing the sentences.

The predicational model would, of course, predict

these results noting that the choices of erroneous items
were guided by the subjects' predications of the meaningfulness of the actual words.

Thus, I must concede that the

more advanced Lockean models can account for this finding
given proper modifications, but as was noted by Chang
(1986), such models, have so much flexibility in their
theoretical constructs that they can account for almost any
phenomenon.

The predicational model has an advantage of ac-

counting for this result parsimoniously, expecting the ob-
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tained pattern of scores based upon its theoretical tenets.
The results did not show the predicted main effect of
the type of sentence for trial to criterion scores.

The

most probable statistical culprit is the lack of variance.
It took subjects on the average 4.57 trials to reach the
learning criterion for the whole list.

This indicates that

the lists were too simple and thus too readily learned to
capture the possible difference between the positive and the
negative sentences (Labertaux, 1968).
Another plausible explanation of this failure to find
the predicted main effect refers back to the influence of
the subjects' predication of the task on their performance.
This study also differs from the previous research on
affective assessment in that experimental material was
presented on a computer.

The experimenter observed that

subjects were more or less evenly split in terms of their
familiarity with the computer.

Although there are no data

to assess the relationship between one's familiarity with an
apparatus and his/her attitude toward the task, it is a possibility that those less familiar with the apparatus might
have had a negative predication of the task itself and thus
learned along the negative dimension (see Rychlak & Marceil,
in press).

Therefore, the predicted RV-positive effect was

"washed out."

Given the field's increasing reliance on

computer generated presentations of experimental material,
this topic should be investigated in some detail.
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Still another issue is that unlike previous research
on affective assessment, subjects were not required to rate
the material themselves.

The assumption of the correspon-

dence between the nomothetic rating of items in terms of
"positive" or "negative,"

and the subject's idiographic

affective assessment of the items' meaningfulness should be
explored further.

This issue may be strictly procedural,

pertaining to how the instructions for raters and subjects
are worded.

The sentences used here were written to convey

evaluative information about "John" and without an appreciation of this meaning, the sentences are meaningless.

The

raters were asked to state if the sentences conveyed a
positive or negative impression of "John," and the subjects
were asked to simply state if the word completion was positive or negative.

Hence, the task used in this experiment

might have required raters and subjects to predicate the
sentences in terms of an evaluative dimension that was
semantic, rather than affective in the sense of meaningfulness.

As meaning, the evaluative dimension may be a

reflection of societal norms or linguistic convention for
conveying the sense of "positive" or "negative,"

rather

than a sense of personal significance or importance.
distinction

The

between "evaluative meaning" and meaningfulness

could be viewed in terms of the dimension of objectivity as
well as a matter of purpose.

In the case of "evaluative

meaning" sequacious extension of meaning is for the sake of
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understanding the sentence, rather than for the sake of its
personal value or significance.

Thus, if the purpose is to

understand, both positive and negative meanings are equally
important and we would not find the expected RV positive
effect.

The variations in the presented instruction would

help to investigate this question.
Based on the findings of this study that affective
quality of the items were known before the actual items were
learned, there is evidence to suggest that the predicational
process was involved regardless of whether this was a case
of affective meaningfulness or evaluative meaning.

In

either case, the affective quality of the word can be
construed as the broad conceptual structure lending meaning
to the items learned, and/or
responses.

determining the pattern of

As was discussed above, a number of methodologi-

cal and theoretical issues challenge this interpretation of
the results.

Some of the methodological issues were

countered with anecdotal evidence and thus warrant further
investigation.

The theoretical issues are harder to resolve

since they are based on assumptions that go beyond the logic
of the empirical validation of the hypotheses.

In regard to

these, one must invoke the principles of parsimony.

The

predicational model provides a clear explanation of the
results presented here, since they are predicted by the
model itself based upon its assumption pertaining to the
nature of the cognitive process.
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APPENDIX A
Instruction Given to Raters Making Judgement of Semantic
Relatedness Between the Subjects' Responses and
Actual Predicates
Following is a list consisting of sentences used in a psychology experiment. As you can see, the last word, the
sentence's predicate, is underlined. Underneath each sentence you will find a list of words. Please, read these
words one at a time, and decide if a given word can be substituted for the sentence's predicate without altering the
meaning of that sentence. If you think that a word can in
fact be substituted in the sentence, please put a check mark
next to it. Please repeat this procedure for each sentence
in the list.
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APPENDIX B
Lists of Sentences Used in the Experiment
Their Stem-Predicate Designations and Freguency Norms
In dangerous situations, John is careful. (A)
careless (A)

NP
NN

If fault is assigned, John is innocent. (41)
guilty
(38)

NP
NN

When others are in trouble, John is concerned.(11) NP
uncaring (10) NN
On a rainy day, John is happy.(AA)
sad
(A)

NP
NN

In solving problems, John is fast. (AA)
slow (A)

PP
PN

When competing with others, John is active (A)
passive (7)

PP
PN

When eating, John is neat. (29)
messy (17)

pp

When bad things are likely, John is unlucky.(24)
lucky
(24)

NN
NP

When others are rude, John is impolite (20)
polite
(10)

NN
NP

When watching a movie, John is loud.(A)
quiet (A)

PN
PP

If schedule must be kept, John is tardy. (7)
prompt (19)

PN
PP

When it comes to money, John is stingy. (1)
generous (40)

PN
PP

When attending a party, John is timid.(15)
outgoing(l)

PN
PP

When life gets strained, John is tense (A)
relaxed (A)

NN
NP

Thorndike and Lorge norms are in parenthesis

PN
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APPENDIX C
Instructions Given to the Raters
Judging the Affective Valence of the Sentences
Following is a list of sentences that state something
about a fictitious person named John. As you read each
sentence, please indicate if you feel that a sentence makes
a positive or a negative statement about John. We have provided a scale at the end of each sentence, so all you will
have to do is to circle P if you feel that a sentence makes
a positive statement, or N if you feel that a sentence makes
a negative statement. We ask you to rate each sentence one
at a time as you go down the list and not to correct your
initial rating.
As you rate each sentence, you will notice that the
last word of each sentence is underlined. Once you have
finished rating every sentence on the list, please, go back
to the beginning and try to write down as many synonyms to
the underlined word in each sentence as you can within approximately one minute. To do so use the blank space below
each sentence. As before, work on one sentence at a time.
Once, you have finished writing synonyms for the underlined
word in a given sentence, do not return to that word once
you have begun working on the word in the next sentence.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE YOU START?
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APPENDIX D
Instructions Given to Raters Making a Judgment Regarding
the Affective Valence of the Sentence Stems
Following is a list of phrases we took from a list we
are planning to use in an experiment. As you read each
phrase, please indicate if you feel that this phrase makes a
positive or a negative statement. We have provided a scale
at the end of each sentence, so all you will have to do is
to circle P if you feel that a sentence makes a positive
statement, or N if you feel that a sentence makes a negative
statement. We ask you to rate one sentence at a time as you
go down the list and not to correct your initial rating.

102

APPENDIX E
Raw Scores
Affective Judgment Condition
S#

TTC*

Match-Ratio Scores

P(a)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

PP(c) PN(d)NP(e)NN(f)

N(b)

0
0.50
0.50
0
1.00
1.00
0.33
1.00
1.00
0.33
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50
0
1.00
1.00
1.00
0
1.00
1.00
0
1. 00
1.00
.69

1. 00 0.40
1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00
0.43 0.50
1.00 1.00
1.00
0
0.83 0.80
1.00 1.00
0.4 1.00
0.25 1.00
1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00
1.00 0.50
0.25 0.40
0.75 0.86
0.50 0.83
1.00 1.00
1.00 0.25
0.57 0
0.50 0.85
0.33 0.80
1.00 0.20
1.00 1.00
1.00 1.00
.71
.78

TTC stands for Trials to criterion scores
P signifies Positive sentences
N signifies Negative sentences
PP signifies Positive stem, Positive word
PN signifies Positive stem, Negative word
NP signifies Negative stem, Positive word
NN signifies Negative stem, Negative word

completion
completion
completion
completion

mean

6
6
5
8
3
4
7
3
3
3
6
4
4
4
6
9
3
3
3
5
6
5
4
5
4.68

4
5
4
7
4
4
7
5
4
3

1.00
0.17
1.00
0.50
1. 00
1.00

o.

4

5
2
4
5
8
7
6
2
5
6
8
6
5
4.92

mean

1.00
0.50
1.00
1.00
0.67
1.00
0.43
0.75
1.00
1.00
0.14
0.83
1.00
0.67
1.00
1.00
1.00
.79

Note:
*)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
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Similarity Judgment Condition

S#

Match-ratio scores

TTC*
P(a)

26

7

27
28

3

29
30
31
32
33
34
35

4

46

4
3
6
4
5
5
5
6
5
5
6
2
3
5
4
3
3

7
5
3
2
3
5
6
5
4
3
5
6
5
5
6
3
5
2
4
4
2

mean

4.33

4.29

3

36
37
38

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

PP(c)PN(d)NP(e)NN(f)

N(b)

0.33 1.00 0
1.00 1.00 0.25
0
1.00 1.00
1.00 0.50 1.00
0.12 0
0.20
0
0
1.00
0

0

0

1.00 1.00 1.00
1.00 0
0
0.66 0.33 0.25
0
0
1.00
0
1.00 0.50
1.00 1.00 1.00
0
0.50 0.50
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0

1.00 1.00
1.00 1. 00
1.00 1.00
0
0.50

mean

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.50

0.20
0

1.00
1.00
0.12
0.15
0

1.00
0

0.25
0
0

1.00
1.00
0

0.33
1.00
0

1. 00
1.00
1.00

0.44 0.59 0.43 0.49

Note:
*)
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

TTC stands for Trials to crit4rion scores
P signifies Positive sentences
N signifies Negative sentences
PP signifies Positive stem, Positive word
PN signifies Positive stem, Negative word
NP signifies Negative stem, Positive word
NN signifies Negative stem, Negative word

completion
completion
completion
completion
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